Psychology and developmental psychology alike are dominated by a core assum
ption concerning the nature of representation, an assumption that represent
ation has the nature of an encoding. I argue that this assumption is false
and offer an alternative model of representation based on the pragmatics of
action. Encodingism yields multitudinous and multifarious problems. proble
ms which I have addressed in detail elsewhere. One of the central problems
of encodingism, however. is that it creates a class of fatal problems colle
ctively called ''the frame problems." I argue that the frame problems origi
nate in the inherent requirement that encoding representations carry explic
it content-if the content were not explicit, then the encoding would not en
code anything and would not be a representation at all. These problems-and
others, such that encodings cannot emerge, and, therefore, render developme
nt impossible-visit themselves on theories that are constructed within an e
ncodingist set of presuppositions. Conversely, the interactive alternative
model of representation that I offer has its own powerful consequences for
development-the issues at stake are not trivial. (C) 2001 Academic Press.