This article critically discusses a time-honoured thesis in the social scie
nce literature, that membership control over union policy may be undesirabl
e due to its potentially adverse effects on third parties and/ or society a
s a whole. Based on extensive held research in Italy, the article first ana
lyses the issue in general terms and then illustrates empirically two scena
rios in which the presence of democratic decision-making procedures (that i
s, procedures which both involve the rank and file workers and give them ul
timate decision-making power) is not only compatible but even conducive to
'responsible' union behaviour while their absence leads to opposite outcome
s. The two empirical illustrations examine the trajectory of centralized ba
rgaining in Italy between the 1980s and 1990s and the tradeoffs facing the
employees of two matched-paired factories in the Mezzogiorno, respectively.