A neo-Husserlian theory of speaker's reference

It is not well known that in his Gottingen period (19001916) Edmund Husserl developed a kind of direct reference theory, anticipating, among other thi ngs, the distinction between referential and attributive use of a definite description, which was rediscovered by Keith Donnellan in 1966 and further analysed by Saul Kripke in 1977. This paper defends the claim that Husserl' s idea of the mental act given voice to in an utterance sheds new light on that distinction and particularly on cases where semantic referent and spea ker's referent diverge. It is argued that when embedded in a dynamic theory of intentionality, the idea of giving-voice-to allows for a pragmatic (as opposed to a purely semantic) analysis of such cases. In Section 1 an examp le involving a referentially used description is presented, and the view th at descriptions that can be used both attributively and referentially are t hus ambiguous is criticized. Section 2 is concerned with Husserl's discussi on of a case where someone seems to demonstratively refer to something that he mistakes for something else. On the basis of this discussion, a dynamic conception of the intentional content (and referent) of the mental act giv en voice to in an utterance is developed. Section 3 applies this neo-Husser lian conception to the example described in Section 1. Finally, it is shown how this conception serves to elucidate the referential/attributive distin ction.