Solving the tenants' dilemma: Collective action and norms of co-operation in housing

According to Mancur Olson's free-rider theorem, collective action will neit her be initiated, nor sustained unless it is found profitable by every sing le participant. This "n-person prisoners' dilemma" indicates that the succe ssful cases of co-operation, not the failures, call for an explanation; thi s is the theoretical starting point for a study of tenant involvement in Sw edish housing estates. The local histories of 26 housing estates of differe nt characters and forms of tenure were reconstructed in order to trace the norms and other social mechanisms behind the sustenance and institutionaliz ation of collective action. In most of the estates where co-operation had b een institutionalized the crucial mechanism seemed to have been the develop ment of norms of local utilitarianism ("I take part if it is needed and I c an contribute to the collective good."). Go-operation based on this noon te nds to be representative rather than direct, and the level of activity is c omparatively low. In some types of estates more contract-like norms of reci procity ("I take part if others take part.") had also developed. Selective economic incentives and tenants' self-realization were of less importance i n upholding co-operation in housing estates. Institutionalization of co-ope ration was observed in all types of estate, regardless of physical and soci al characteristics. In the critical consolidation phase, an important role was played by norms of everyday Kantianism ("I take part regardless of what others do."). Leisure activities and "estate days", information to tenants , etc., were important in developing and reproducing a local identity and s ocial norms of co-operation.