Putnam revived interest in the "Schelling conjecture" that in international
bargaining, a domestic ratification constraint provides a negotiator with
a bargaining advantage. However, existing formal analyses of the Schelling
conjecture generally allow only one side in the bargaining to be constraine
d. In this article, a model is analyzed in which both negotiators are const
rained. A generalized version of the Schelling conjecture holds that if one
negotiator's constraint is high and the other's is only low or medium, the
former gets a better deal than if neither side were constrained, and the l
atter is worse off. With incomplete information, however, the complete oppo
site of what the Schelling conjecture predicts can occur, and there is an e
quilibrium in which delay in reaching an agreement results in both sides be
ing worse off than if neither side were constrained. Incomplete information
can but does not always completely eliminate the advantage of having a hig
h constraint.