The sources of threat credibility in extended deterrence

For deterrence to work, a potential attacker needs to perceive the deterrer 's threats as capable and credible for retaliation. The issue of relative c apabilities has been extensively analyzed, yet the core problem concerns cr edible intentions. The strategic literature is largely influenced by commit ment theory prescribing various "manipulation of risk" strategies intended to enhance threat credibility. A few analysts, however, challenge this view and recognize the importance of "intrinsic interests" in the issues at sta ke (i.e., inherent credibility), which can limit the effectiveness of costl y signals. These two alternative views are quantitatively tested in the cas es of major-powers deterrence from 1895 to 1985. A new measure of the obser vable category of inherent credibility is also introduced, consisting of th e regional interests of major powers in the area of dispute. The results in dicate strong and significant effects of regional interests on both the ons et and outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence, thus suggesting relevant theoretical and policy implications.