Virtue ethics, the 'Analects', and the problem of commensurability (Structural similarities between Aristotelian and Confucian conceptions of self-cultivation)

In support of the thesis that virtue ethics allows for a more comprehensive and consistent interpretation of the Analects than other possible models, the author uses a structural outline of a virtue ethic (derived from Alasda ir MacIntyre's account of the Aristotelian tradition) to organize a discuss ion of the text. The resulting interpretation focuses attention on the reli gious aspects of Confucianism and accounts for aspects of the text that are otherwise difficult to explain. In addition, the author argues that the st ructural similarities between the Aristotelian and Confucian conceptions of self-cultivation indicate a dimension of commensurability between the two traditions, despite very real variations in specific content. Finally, the author suggests how crosscultural commensurability, in general, can be unde rstood on a theoretical level.