Reciprocal altruism under conditions of partner selection

This paper is a contribution to solving the problem of whether reciprocal a ltruism can emerge and maintain itself in a population of selfish individua ls. We use an evolutionary game theoretic simulation model (the Social Evol ution Model) to investigate the relative fitness of two versions of a recip rocal altruistic trait competing with a defecting trait. One main differenc e between the Social Evolution Model and most of the models that are known in this field is that partner selection is straightforwardly built into the strategies of the players. In most of the models in the literature, partne r selection is not an Option in the game. Because of this element of forced play, much attention is given to the ability of strategies to detect cheat ers and to retaliate. We show that modeling partner selection points to dis advantages of a preoccupation with cheater-detection and to the importance of committing oneself to a partner.