Over the past few decades, the interest in executive functions has been gro
wing, both in cognitive psychology and in neuropsychology. Already for some
time, neuropsychologists have been trying to gain insight in the origins o
f the prefrontal syndrome. The crucial problem they are facing is related t
o the validity and reliability of the neuropsychological tests used to asse
ss the dysexecutive syndrome (Rabbitt, 1997). Validity is a problem because
the syndrome is ill-defined and multifaceted. Executive control is require
d in many situations, among others in situations that involve planning and
decision making, in situations that involve error correction or trouble sho
oting, in situations where well-learned responses are lacking, in dangerous
or technically difficult situations and in situations that require the ove
rcoming of a strong habitual response or that require resistance to temptat
ion (Burgess, 1997, p. 84). Although all these aspects are quite typical of
the dysexecutive syndrome, most patients will fail only in some of the sit
uations listed. Consequently, a test which is sensitive to a particular def
icit (e.g., planning) may be insensitive to other deficits (e.g., inhibitio
n). For these reasons, low correlations are expected between tests in a sam
ple of prefrontal patients. Moreover, many so-called frontal tests share fe
atures with problem-solving and intelligence tests, which leads some schola
rs to propose that executive function is nothing but Spearman's g (see e.g.
, Sternberg, 1985). Yet there is evidence against this view (e.g., Ardila,
Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000; Crinella & Yu, 2000).