Manipulative features of planning styles

This paper identities features of well-known planning modes affecting the l ikelihood of manipulation. Results from social choice theory and the econom ic theory of organisation help to explain why certain combinations of plann ing styles and organisational characteristics stimulate or hamper manipulat ion. Although the planning process can be rigged in many ways, false revela tion of preferences and strategic agenda formation are primarily studied he re. When each decisionmaker can rank the alternatives any way he or she wan ts, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that manipulation-free procedu res for making recommendations do not exist unless cyclical decisions or hi gh concentrations of power are accepted. In general, a low probability of c yclical recommendations and a strong organisational bias favouring certain interests and alternatives reduce the likelihood of successful manipulation . It is argued that these conditions are present particularly in advocacy p lanning and-perhaps counterintuitively-to some extent in disjointed increme ntalism.