SUBLIMINAL AFFECTIVE PRIMING RESISTS ATTRIBUTIONAL INTERVENTIONS

We examine two explanations of the subliminal affective priming effect . The feelngs-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1988) holds that judgements are based on perceptible feelings. Hence, affective influen ces depend on the source to which feelings are (mis)attributed. In con trast, the affective primary hypothesis (Zajonc, 1980) suggests that a ffective influences should resist attributional interventions. This is because the affective system responsible for preferences is separate from the cognitive system responsible for inferences; because early af fective processes are automatic and therefore inaccessible to higher-o rder interventions; and because early affective responses are not repr esented as conscious feelings. We tested these explanations in two exp eriments that crossed subliminal affective priming with (mis)attributi on manipulations. Both studies found reliable shifts in judgements of neutral stimuli as a result of primes even when subjects were aware th at their feelings might not be diagnostic for the judgement at hand. S ubjects did not report experiencing any feelings in response to the pr imes. The obtained affective priming effect was independent of respons e times and subjective reports of engaging in judgemental corrections. However, the priming effect did prove sensitive to the experimental i nstructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the aff ective primacy hypothesis and the feelings-as-information model.