Ga. Krause, THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION - BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE OVER SECURITIES-REGULATION, American journal of political science, 40(4), 1996, pp. 1083-1121
Theory: A dynamic systems model of administrative politics that (1) re
laxes restrictive causal assumptions among the president, Congress, an
d an administrative agency, (2) emphasizes aggregate institutional beh
avior, and (3) analyzes both anticipated and unanticipated policy beha
vior is set forth as a more general means to investigate agency-politi
cal relationships. Hypotheses: The main set of hypotheses focus on the
aggregate institutional relationships among the president, Congress,
and administrative agency. These four possible hypotheses include bure
aucratic influence, bureaucratic autonomy, mutual influence, and polit
ical influence. The purpose here is to assess the relative merits of c
ompeting explanations for bureaucratic behavior: Securities regulation
is a per feet area of inquiry to investigate these competing perspect
ives since the findings of existing research on this topic are dispara
te. Methods: Vector autoregressive time series statistical methods are
used to empirically test the dynamic systems model of administrative
politics by examining three empirical models of SEC enforcement behavi
or in relation to presidential and congressional budgetary preference
signals for the 1949-92 annual period. Results: The SEC sends potent s
ignals of their own (via their changes in regulatory outputs) that wil
l affect the budgetary preferences of its political principles. Howeve
r, the SEC's administrative outputs are shown to be somewhat less sens
itive to political budgetary preference signals than what one would ex
pect. Presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals (wit
h respect to the SEC) are interdependent to a sizeable extent, thus ra
ising doubts about the separate, independent effect democratic institu
tions have over the bureaucracy. The implications of this study sugges
t that conventional theories of agency-political relations serve as an
oversimplified way to study administrative behavior. Future research
on this topic