If we are to preserve qualia, one possibility is to take the current academ
ic, philosophical, and theoretical notion less seriously and current natura
l science and some pre-theoretical intuitions about qualia more seriously.
Dennett (1997) is instrumental in showing how ideas of the intrinsicalness
and privacy of qualia are misguided and those of ineffability and immediacy
misinterpreted. However, by combining ideas of non-mechanicalness used in
contemporary natural science with the pre-theoretical idea that qualia are
special because they are unique, we get a notion of qualia that is acceptab
le to naturalistic philosophy. The notion of unique qualia is not opposed t
o the idea that some of the characterizations of qualia have to be qualifie
d. It is the folk-philosophical, academic, notions of theoreticity and conc
eptuality that have to be modified.