Concepts and intuitions: Adorno after the linguistic turn

Adorno's conception of conceptually articulated experience can be defended and made fruitful for a critical philosophy after the so-called linguistic turn. The aim is both to answer the criticisms raised by Jurgen Habermas an d others that Adorno's philosophy remains bound by the premises of a subjec t-centred philosophy, and to criticize social-pragmatism from the vantage-p oint of Adorno's philosophy of language. It is shown that Adorno is committ ed to a picture of experience very much in line with the recent views of Jo hn McDowell, which extends the space of reasons beyond the space of concept s. Further, it is shown that non-inferential justification can be combined with an expressivist picture of judgment. Finally, it is argued that what i s called the extended space of reasons is ultimately social; that represent ation, the aboutness of thought, serves expressive roles in a socially arti culated space of reason-giving. The advantage of Adorno's position, vis-a-v is a one-sided social-pragmatism consists in his defence of what is called subjective-material proprieties of judgment. Adorno's idea that the extende d space of reasons implies the acknowledgement of what he refers to as the non-identical within conceptually articulated experience is thus reconstruc ted adn defended. Such non-identity, it is claimed, is exhibited in success ful art-works which thereby ought to be counted as forms of reasoning. On t his basis, Adorno's philosophy acquires critical and normative significance after the linguistic turn.