The arithmetic of defence policy

The Kosovo campaign of 1999 demonstrated unambiguously the weakness of Euro pean military forces. Recognition of the consequences of this lack of capab ility has put new vigour into the European defence debate. Yet decline in m ilitary capability is systemic in every European country. The Helsinki goal s will do nothing to address this decline. National defence budgets over th e past IS years have been decreasing in real terms. Even if current aspirat ions to hold military spending levels were to be achieved, the decline in c apabilities would continue. Military equipment and personnel costs rise fas ter than domestic inflation, and therefore fewer people and weapons systems can be afforded each year. There is no prospect of significant uplifts in defence budgets in Europe, despite the acknowledged need for a range of exp ensive enabling capabilities for post-Cold War operations. Palliative measu res now on trial are unlikely to have a major impact. The only option for E uropean nations is a progressive integration of their forces to realize the economies of scale that would allow effectiveness to be maintained. There are opportunities for initiatives that would produce short-term pay-offs. D espite the severe political difficulties of a long-term plan for integratio n, the alternative is worse. Trying to maintain sovereignty in defence prov ision will mean that the nations of Europe will eventually be unable either to meet the requirements of even their most modest security needs or to ex ercise any influence over US defence and security policies.