Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces

Several factors explain the high level of support for non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) in Russia and the correspondingly limited interest in NSNF a rms control. These include Russia's conventional military weakness, NATO's conventional military superiority, political assessments that portray NATO as threatening to Russia, and the several important functions assigned to R ussia's nuclear weapons and to NSNF in particular by Russian military doctr ine and policy. The Russians have made it clear that they attach great impo rtance to NSNF in a number of ways:in their preoccupations during the NATO- Russia Founding Act negotiations in 1996-7; in their recent military exerci ses; in their decisions regarding NSNF modernization; in their lack of tran sparency in implementing their 1991-2 commitments to reduce and eliminate c ertain types of NSNF; and in their discussions about possibly abandoning ce rtain nuclear arms control commitments. Russian interests in using NSNF to deter powers other than NATO (such as China), to substitute for advanced no n-nuclear precision-strike systems, and to 'de-escalate' regional conflicts (among other functions attributed to NSNF) would not be modified by the co urse of action some observers have advocated-a unilateral withdrawal of US NSNF from Europe. Such a withdrawal would, however, damage the Western alli ance's security interests. NATO has adopted the most practical objective cu rrently available: pursuing greater transparency regarding NSNF in the NATO -Russia Permanent Joint Council.