The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for a
n embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still w
idely debated phenomenon seen in 7-12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classi
c "A-not-B error," infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at locatio
n "A" continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidd
en in a nearby location "B." Here, we question the traditional explanations
of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects or other stat
ic mental structures. Instead, we demonstrate that the A-not-B error and it
s previously puzzling contextual variations can be understood by the couple
d dynamics of the ordinary processes of goal-directed actions: looking, pla
nning, reaching, and remembering. We offer a formal dynamic theory and mode
l based on cognitive embodiment that both simulates the known A-not-B effec
ts and offers novel predictions that match new experimental results. The de
monstration supports an embodied view by casting the mental events involved
in perception, planning, deciding, and remembering in the same analogic dy
namic language as that used to describe bodily movement, so that they may b
e continuously meshed. We maintain that this mesh is a pre-eminently cognit
ive act of "knowing" not only in infancy but also in everyday activities th
roughout the life span.