The dynamics of embodiment: A field theory of infant perseverative reaching

The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for a n embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still w idely debated phenomenon seen in 7-12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classi c "A-not-B error," infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at locatio n "A" continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidd en in a nearby location "B." Here, we question the traditional explanations of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects or other stat ic mental structures. Instead, we demonstrate that the A-not-B error and it s previously puzzling contextual variations can be understood by the couple d dynamics of the ordinary processes of goal-directed actions: looking, pla nning, reaching, and remembering. We offer a formal dynamic theory and mode l based on cognitive embodiment that both simulates the known A-not-B effec ts and offers novel predictions that match new experimental results. The de monstration supports an embodied view by casting the mental events involved in perception, planning, deciding, and remembering in the same analogic dy namic language as that used to describe bodily movement, so that they may b e continuously meshed. We maintain that this mesh is a pre-eminently cognit ive act of "knowing" not only in infancy but also in everyday activities th roughout the life span.