Changes in the provisions of the United States Banking Act of 1933 have all
owed the entry of commercial banks into the initial public offering (IPO) u
nderwriting market. In this paper, we examine the effect of commercial bank
equity underwriting on the fees paid to auditors. We predict that IPO assu
rance fees will be higher for equity offerings underwritten by commercial b
anks than for offerings handled by traditional underwriters because (1) com
mercial banks are relatively inexperienced in bringing firms public, requir
ing additional assistance from accounting firms in the IPO process; (2) new
entrants into the underwriting market may manage lower quality issues that
require additional assurance services; and/or (3) since commercial banks h
ave greater resources than do traditional investment banks, they are likely
to be exposed to greater litigation risk, providing incentives for commerc
ial bank underwriters to ensure that the IPO firm purchases greater assuran
ce from the auditor. However, we expect fees to decrease if a previous lend
ing relationship existed between the commercial bank and its client. Our fi
ndings, based on a sample of issues brought to market between 1991 and 1997
, support these expectations.