From the obedience to the duty to the morality of virtue (deontologism, consequentialism and the ethics of virtue)

Out of divergent answers to the question of the obligatoriness of the moral action three different ethic conceptions (deontologism, consequentialism a nd the ethics of virtue) developed, which define themselves as incompatible or opposite. Contrary to this attitude, the author argues, the possession of certain virtues is inseparable from moral choice and action, regardless of the subject's preference for deontological or consequentialist perspecti ve. Her idea is that neither the imperative of the obedience to the duty no r the responsibility for the consequences of one's action operates independ ently and against the moral conviction of the subject. First, she defines the concept of duty and its importance for moral action as articulated in the respective conceptions. Further she attempts to show that the deontologism does not reject the concept of virtue itself. It is r ather its reinterpretation that makes moral rules the standards of judging the action, which is questionable. In conclusion, she tries to explain how important the virtues are for doing good, by justifying the coexistence of virtue and happiness.