The efforts of interest groups to pass family and medical leave polici
es are illustrative of a dilemma confronting advocates of policy innov
ation. Faced with strong opposition from business lobbies and in many
cases reluctant legislatures and veto-wielding executives, proponents
of family and medical leave had to balance their desire to pass the po
licy they wanted against their desire to pass a policy. This study exa
mines the family and medical leave policy process at the federal level
and in three illustrative states. The study finds that coalitions of
''insiders'' are more likely To get family and medical leave policies
enacted both because they have more political clout and because they a
re more likely to propose moderate bills and to be willing to compromi
se. However, the policies enacted by the insider coalitions generally
cater barely half the population and are unpaid. This lends credibilit
y to the arguments of members of ''outsider'' groups that there is a v
alue in proposing more wide-ranging policies.