The means of the European Commission to influence European policies are bei
ng discussed predominantly with view to its agenda-setting powers. Institut
ionalist analyses have shown how the Commission can use agenda setting to b
ring to bear its own political preferences on the Council. With view to oth
er Commission rights, in contrast, there have not been similar systematic a
nalyses to show the Commission's impact on European policies. In this artic
le it is shown how the Commission can use its rights following from its rol
e as a guardian of the Treaty and from competition law strategically. By si
multaneously imposing threats on the Member States, the Commission can pres
ent its proposals to the Council as a "lesser evil", pressurizing the Counc
il into acceptance. The paper shows the scope and limits of this strategy a
nd takes into consideration how other studies discussing the Commission's p
owers fit into this framework of analysis.