U. Frick et al., Hospital financing in in-patient psychiatry via DRG-based prospective payment - The Salzburg experience, PSYCHIAT PR, 28, 2001, pp. S55-S62
Hospital financing via case-related prospective payment sometimes is suspec
ted to be responsible for accelerating the "revolving-door"-phenomenon in p
sychiatry. According to this reasoning, stablishing diagnoses-related group
s (DRGs) ruling a prospective payment system could not only reduce lengths
of stay but could also simultaneously raise hospitalization and readmission
rates. This study analyses the Austrian experience after the implementatio
n of such a payment system,the "performance-oriented financing of hospitals
" (leistungsorientierte Krankenanstalten-Finanzierung, LKF) in 1997. Time s
eries analyses based on the complete hospital discharge statistics of the S
alzburg province were used as methods. Results showed that neither length o
f stay, nor hospitalization or readmission rates in psychiatry have substan
cially changed or deviated from their long-term trends after implementation
of the LKF system. Other medical disciplines have experienced statisticall
y significant changes. The possibility to transfer these results to the Ger
man psychiatric health care system is discussed.