ELECTION FREQUENCY AND THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION IN A SIMULATED INTERGROUP CONFLICT

The present study simulates an enduring intergroup conflict in which e ach of two interacting groups is represented by a single representativ e elected for a given period. The authors assume that the conflict bet ween the two groups can be modeled as an iterated prisoner's dilemma g ame played by the groups' representatives, and that the performance of each representative influences her constituents which, in turn, affec ts her prospects for reelection. At the end of a constituency period n ew elections are called, and their results determine whether the deleg ate remains in her position or is replaced by another representative. The main objectives are: (1) to investigate the effect of this common democratic procedure, namely, the periodic election of group represent atives, on the evolution of cooperation between the groups; and (2) to investigate the effect of the frequency of elections in the two group s on evolving intergroup relations. Outcomes of 360 simulations yielde d the following main results: (1) the dynamics of the intergroup confl ict evolve into five phases of well-defined patterns; (2) for most ele ction frequencies, mutual defection was not an enduring pattern wherea s mutual cooperation evolved as an enduring pattern; and (3) there exi sts an election frequency that optimizes the likelihood that the inter group process converges to mutual cooperation.