Maternal-fetal surgery: The fallacy of abstraction and the problem of equipoise

When surgery is performed on pregnant women for the sake of the fetus (MFS or maternal fetal surgery), it is often discussed in terms of the fetus alo ne. This usage exemplifies what philosophers call the fallacy of abstractio n: considering a concept as if it were separable from another concept whose meaning is essentially related to it. In light of their potential separabi lity, research on pregnant women raises the possibility of conflicts betwee n the interests of the woman and those of the fetus. Such research should m eet the requirement of equipoise, i.e., a state of genuine uncertainty abou t the risks and benefits of alternative interventions or noninterventions. While illustrating the fallacy of abstraction in discussions of MFS, we rev iew the rationale for explicit acknowledgment of the essential tie between fetus and pregnant woman. Next we examine whether it is possible to meet th e requirement of equipoise in research on MFS, focusing on a fetal conditio n called myelomeningocele. We show how issues related to equipoise in nonpr egnant populations appear also in debates regarding MFS. We also examine ev idence in support of claims that the requirement of equipoise has been sati sfied with respect to ``the fetal patient'' while considering risks and ben efits to gestating women only marginally or not at all. After delineating c hallenges and possibilities for equipoise in MFS research, we conclude with a suggestion for avoiding the fallacy of abstraction and achieving equipoi se so that research on MFS may be ethically conducted.