This study, using data from the Chinese stock market, investigates the rela
tionship between earnings management induced by profitability regulation an
d modified audit opinions (MAOs). We review recent developments in the acco
unting profession and in independent auditing to foster an understanding of
the environment in which Chinese auditing operates. Based on annual report
s published by listed companies from 1995 to 1997, we analyze the underlyin
g reasons for MAOs. Our test results show a significant association between
receiving MAOs and reporting profits marginally above the target levels sp
ecified in stock de-listing and rights offering regulations. Our findings a
re consistent with the notion that asymmetric profitability requirements ex
acerbate managers' propensity to engage in earnings management, which in tu
rn is positively associated with receiving MAOs. Though based on Chinese da
ta, our findings are of general interest because they address a fundamental
issue of trade-offs between expected costs and expected benefits in decidi
ng whether to avoid MAOs in a transitional economy.