RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM IN HUMAN SOCIAL EVOLUTION - THE VIABILITY OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM WITH A PREFERENCE FOR OLD-HELPING-PARTNERS

This article is a contribution to a solution of the problem of how coo peration emerged in human social evolution, Contrary to models based o n evolutionary game theory, the model presented here can provide a pot ential explanation of the emergence of cooperation and, at the same ti me, of group living, On the basis of assumptions with regard to indivi dual (cognitive) capacities and ecological conditions, a dynamic objec t-oriented simulation model (the social evolution model [SEM]) is cons tructed to investigate the viability of social and asocial strategies of giving and requesting support, In this article, the SEM is used to examine whether social strategies with a ''prefer-old-helping-partners '' trait are viable in competition with asocial (cheating) strategies, It is found that social strategies take over small populations if the ir proportion is not too small and if conditions are harsh, In larger populations and if their proportions are not too small, they are able to prevent a takeover by the asocial strategies, In the discussion, we touch upon the implications of the SEM for the controversial issue of group altruism. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science Inc.