When Germany liberalised its electricity market in April 1998, wholesale an
d heavy industry prices fell by as much as 60%. This was initially seen aro
und the world as a success story in electricity market liberalisation as it
involved a minimum of institutional interference. However, this approach m
ay have become a victim of its own success. Facing a significant fall in pr
ofits, the largest generators adopted a strategic response with three seque
ntial phases: (i) cut costs so as to be able to lower prices and maximise m
arket share to deter entry, (ii) seek regulatory approval to acquire or mer
ge with rivals to create four dominant vertically integrated firms, and (ii
i) close marginal plant to reduce overcapacity. Using a model-based simulat
ion approach that has previously been successfully applied to strategic beh
aviour in the UK electricity market, this paper demonstrates that the proce
ss of strategic consolidation could result in average annual on-peak prices
rising by 87% and average annual off-peak prices by 50%. Furthermore, the
impact of an increase in industry concentration would be magnified as gener
ators' close their marginal plant. The creation of four dominant firms, who
have the discretion to strategically withdraw capacity, appears to result
in a substantial increase in market power in the wholesale electricity mark
et and hence a significant rise in prices above the competitive levels that
initially emerged. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.