There are a certain number of rights which, though to some extent different
in detail, all have this essential quality, in common, that they do not ap
ply to external, material objects, but to internal, spiritual, or rather in
tellectual values or products. To my mind no term can be found to character
ize the essence of these rights better and more centrally than "intellectua
l property." As I shall endeavour to show, it has hitherto been an error to
keep these rights apart from the sphere of property law and regard them as
an entirely special kind of rights. This error has to some extent been due
to the fact that the research of the true nature and extent of the right o
f property has been neglected. On due examination these rights will be foun
d to have in reality the same economic and legal effects as the rights of p
roperty in the external material objects; essentially, the two kinds of pro
perty rights involve the same fundamental problems.(1)