This paper studies the revelation of private information by equilibrium pri
ces when conditional probabilities are endogenous. The analysis is confined
to one-period, one-good exchange economies with incomplete asset markets.
It is shown that for a generic set of economies parameterized by endowment
vectors both the set of fully revealing and set of non-revealing (partially
revealing) rational expectations equilibria (REE) are smooth manifolds of
strictly positive dimension. However, the dimension of the manifold of full
y revealing REB is strictly larger than the dimension of the manifold of no
n-revealing (partially revealing) REE. Moreover, the same result holds for
the set of consumption allocations associated with the set of fully reveali
ng REE and non-revealing (partially revealing) REE. Hence, even if conditio
nal probabilities are endogenous, informational efficiency is still the rul
e. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.