Domestic politics and the US-China WTO agreement

This paper examines the influence of domestic politics on US.-China negotia tions over Beijing's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The arg ument is that, contrary to recent theories emphasizing the obstacles domest ic divisions pose to international cooperation, domestic opposition to the WTO agreement in both the United States and China did not constrain the abi lity of American and Chinese negotiators to initiate and reach an agreement . Several conditions facilitated the conclusion of the WTO deal. First, dov ish actors (i.e., those within a country whose preferences are closer to th ose of the foreign country) in both states held greater internal decision-m aking power. Second, the reformist leadership in China considered internati onal cooperation as a way to overcome opposition to their domestic reform a genda and used their authority to circumvent domestic opposition that other wise would have derailed the agreement. Such dramatic changes in elite pref erences in favor of cooperation can in turn be explained by China's increas ing integration with the world economy. Third, the agreement was designed i n the United States in a way that concentrated benefits on the internationa lly-oriented sectors of the economy, thus minimizing opposition from other domestic forces. The paper illustrates the importance of these conditions t o the conclusion of the agreement through a detailed analysis of U.S.-China negotiations between 1999 and 2000 over Chinese entry into the WTO.