In October 2000, at the onset of the latest intifada, key political and sec
urity officials on both the Palestinian and the Israeli side still consider
ed an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal to be politically realisable. Some of
the substance of a mutually acceptable deal finally emerged at the bilatera
l talks held in the Red Sea resort of Taba in late January 2001, but by the
n it was too late to alter the course of events. The present situation of l
ow-intensity conflict will almost certainly persist for the rest of 2001, a
nd in all likelihood for at least another year beyond that. Palestinian Aut
hority President Yasser Arafat bears much of the responsibility for this pr
ecarious state of affairs, though not for the reasons cited by official Isr
aeli sources. Contrary to the Israeli account, his behaviour since the star
t of the intifada has reflected not the existence of a prior strategy based
on the use of force, but the absence of any strategy. His political manage
ment has been marked by a high degree of improvisation and short-termism, c
onfirming the absence of an original strategy and of a clear purpose.