Against one form of judgment-determinism

Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretic al rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgme nts' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstl y, that a deliberator may not consider any specified outcome of his/her imm inent or current deliberation--in this case, his/her assent to some proposi tion--to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'); secondl y, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must ent er into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms that is rationalized by those judgments. My contention is that, given the Openness Requirement, no version of Extreme Determinism can allow for the role played by logical ins ight in the rationalization of judgment. I end by indicating briefly how th is result might figure in a wider argument against any form of determinism about rationalized judgment, and by explaining why I have focused specifica lly upon rebutting a deterministic view of theoretical as opposed in 'pract ical' rationalization.