Irreducible subjectivity and interactionism: A critique

The authors offer a critique of the privileging of subjectivity in psychoan alysis characteristic of what Hanly has called interactionism, with specifi c reference to the work of Renik. First, Renik's argument for the irreducib le subjectivity of the analyst is explored and critiqued from a philosophic al perspective. The need for and plausibility of a subtler notion of object ivity that takes into account the limitations of human subjectivity and tha t analysts can meaningfully pursue is defended. Second, Renik's 're-visioni ng' of psychoanalysis, which follows from his notion of irreducible subject ivity, is explored and critiqued. Renik's view of enactments is contrasted with a 'totalistic' perspective of countertransference that allows for impo rtant, finer conceptual distinctions. Renik's conceptualisation of countert ransference enactments is characterised as a 'special case' of countertrans ference as a vice. Next, Renik's view of transference is critiqued for priv ileging the adaptive dimensions of transference, and for potentially sideli ning archaic dimensions. Finally, Renik's conclusions and 'revisioning' of psychoanalysis are shown to follow from his modifying or jettisoning certai n features of the analytic situation and process. These features and their implications are elaborated on. The conclusion outlines the extent to which the arguments presented can be extended to other advocates of interactioni sm.