Is a cause conceptualized as a generative force?: Evidence from a recognition memory paradigm

How do naive observers conceptualize the causes of behavior? We report evid ence that people frequently view an antecedent event, feeling, or motivatio n as a cause to the extent that it is judged to be a relatively powerful fo rce. Participants in three studies read about situations in which two menta l antecedents (e.g., two different attitudes, motivations, or feelings) wer e consistently associated with the target behavior. One of these antecedent s was always described as more typical of the target figure. In one version , for example, Jean's mistakes on the job were said to be consistently acco mpanied by job-related stress (relatively typical of Jean) and irritation w ith her coworkers (relatively atypical of her). Study I suggested that an e xplicit statement about the relative power or intensity of these antecedent s influenced causal attributions more than did an explicit statement about their relative covariation with the target behavior. Although the vignettes in studies 2 and 3 contained no information about the power of the anteced ents, recognition memory performance indicated that participants inferred t hat the more typical antecedent was a more powerful force than the atypical antecedent. Analyses also suggest that the tendency to attribute more powe r to a typical antecedent mediates covariation-inconsistent judgments of ca usality. In addition, studies 2 and 3 demonstrate the utility of a recognit ion memory task for identifying implicit inferences. (C) 2001 Academic Pres s.