Loyal political cartels and committee assignments in congress: Evidence from the Congressional Black Caucus

Citation
Fg. Mixon et Rw. Ressler, Loyal political cartels and committee assignments in congress: Evidence from the Congressional Black Caucus, PUBL CHOICE, 108(3-4), 2001, pp. 313-330
Citations number
13
Categorie Soggetti
Politucal Science & public Administration
Journal title
PUBLIC CHOICE
ISSN journal
00485829 → ACNP
Volume
108
Issue
3-4
Year of publication
2001
Pages
313 - 330
Database
ISI
SICI code
0048-5829(200108)108:3-4<313:LPCACA>2.0.ZU;2-V
Abstract
This study presents a political model which suggests that monopoly legislat ors form cartel-like organizations (referred to as "memberships'') in an ef fort to extract greater benefits in the political process. Based on a model by Coker and Crain (1994) that provides theoretical and statistical argume nts for congressional committees as loyalty-generating institutions, the in stant research examines committee placement of "members'' of the Congressio nal Black Caucus (CBC) in the U.S. House by Democrat leaders. Voting record s indicate that the CBC is uniform in its voting patterns, indicating carte l-like behavior. Because of this, the Democratic leadership in the House ch ooses to place CBC members on important committees in order to support thei r policy agenda. The general finding of this study is that "black represent ation'' may be greater than simply the proportion of seats held by black Re presentatives.