Auctions with an inexpert bidder

Authors
Deltas, G Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R
Citation
G. Deltas et R. Engelbrecht-wiggans, Auctions with an inexpert bidder, ECON LETT, 73(1), 2001, pp. 35-42
Citations number
8
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ECONOMICS LETTERS
ISSN journal
01651765 → ACNP
Volume
73
Issue
1
Year of publication
2001
Pages
35 - 42
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(200110)73:1<35:AWAIB>2.0.ZU;2-#
Abstract
We consider an auction in which the behavior of one potential bidder depart s mildly from full rationality. We show that the presence of such an inexpe rt bidder can be enough to discourage all of an infinitely large population of fully rational potential bidders from entering an auction. Furthermore, this departure from full rationality does not reduce the inexpert bidder's payoff. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.