Trading butter for guns - Domestic imperatives for foreign policy substitution

The international relations literature largely presumes that leaders engage in foreign policy substitution but does not provide a compelling theoretic al explanation or convincing empirical evidence that substitution occurs. T his article offers a theory of foreign policy choice based on the differenc es between private and public goods. It assumes that private goods and publ ic goods are useful under different circumstances and conditions. Leaders s elect a policy based on political needs, so private- and public-goods appro aches are employed alternatively depending on domestic situations: policies are substituted one for another. The trade-off between aggressive unilater al economic behavior and military conflict as the United States conducted f oreign policy during the cold war is examined. Results show that leaders fa cing economic concerns and/or domestic opposition prefer trade aggression, a patently private-good-like policy, and substitute such policies in respon se to changing domestic stimuli.