Functional concepts, referentially opaque contexts, causal relations, and the definition of theoretical terms

In his recent article, 'Self-Consciousness', George Bealer has set out a no vel and interesting argument against functionalism in the philosophy of min d. I shall attempt to show, however, that Bealer's argument cannot be susta ined. In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be defending three main these s. The first is connected with the problem of defining theoretical predicat es that occur in theories where the following two features are present: fir st, the theoretical predicate in question occurs within both extensional an d non-extensional contexts; secondly, the theory in question asserts that t he relevant theoretical states enter definition of such theoretical terms r equires two distinct quantifiers: one which ranges over concepts, and the o ther which ranges over properties in the world. My second thesis is a corol lary: since the theories on which Bealer is focusing have both of the featu res just mentioned, and since the method that he employs to define theoreti cal terms in his argument against functionalism does not involve both quant ifiers that range over properties and quantifiers that range over concepts, that method is unsound. My final thesis is that when a sound method is use d, Bealer's argument against functionalism no longer goes through. The stru cture of my discussion is as follows: I begin by setting our two arguments- -the one, a condensed version of Bealer's argument, and the other, an argum ent that parallels Bealer's argument very closely. The parallel argument le ads to a conclusion, however that, rather than being merely somewhat surpri sing, seems very implausible indeed. For what the second argument establish es, if sound, is that there can be theoretical terms that apply to objects by virtue of their first-order physical properties, but whose meaning canno t be defined via a Ramsey-style approach. Having set or the two parallel ar gument, I then go on to focus upon the second, to determine what is wrong w ith it. My diagnosis will be that the problem with the argument arises from the fact that it involves defining a theoretical term that occurs both ins ide and outside of opaque contexts, for the method employed fails to take i nto account the fact that the types of entities that are involved in the re levant truthmakers are different when a sentence occurs within a non-extens ional context. I then go on to discuss how one should define a theoretical term that occurs within such theories, and I argue that in such a case one needs two quantifiers ranging over different types of defining theoretical terms can be applied there, and secondly, that, when this is done, it turns out that that argument is also unsound. Next, I consider two responses tha t Bealer might make to my argument, and I argue that those responses would not succeed. Finally, I conclude by asking exactly where the problem lies i n the case of Bealer's argument. My answer will be that it is not simply th e fact that one is dealing with a theoretical term that occurs in both exte nsional and non-extensional contexts. It is rather the combination of that feature together with the fact that the theory in question asserts that the relevant type of theoretical state enters into causal relations. For the f irst of these features means that the Ramsey sentence for the theory must i nvolve quantification over concepts, while the presence of the second featu re means that the Ramsey sentence must involve quantification over properti es in the world, and so no attempt to offer a Ramsey-style account of the m eaning of the relevant theoretical term can succeed unless one employs both quantification over concepts and quantification over properties. Bealer, however, in his argument against functionalism, uses a method of de fining theoretical terms that does not involve both types of quantification , and it is precisely because of this that his argument does not in the end succeed.