This paper looks at the effects of using bus service subsidy to develop the
local bus network through tendering, specifically within the city of Plymo
uth. However, much of this may be applicable to other urban areas. The auth
ors argue that while tendered rural bus services may never cover their marg
inal costs and hence become commercially sustainable, within the urban cont
ext seed-corn funding can frequently be used to pump prime services, which
then go on to become commercial operations, as has been demonstrated in Ply
mouth. By so doing, this releases that subsidy to be used elsewhere within
the network, to develop a further section of that network. For Plymouth, th
e average time that this takes is approximately five years. The issue of op
erators ceasing to cross-subsidise services which may cover their marginal
costs and contribute to overheads, but instead require external subsidy, is
examined. A further question is posed regarding whether the remaining muni
cipal bus companies (which still includes Plymouth Citybus) deliver better
value for money than the publicly listed operators. Finally, although Best
Value is supposedly designed to test value for money, a note of caution is
sounded about its use in this context.