Policing mechanisms in agricultural contracts

In this paper we focus on mechanisms of coordination in agricultural contra cts. Our approach is intended to advance understanding of social relations of production and distribution of power in agrofood systems. Through an ana lysis of contracts between farmers and intermediaries (e.g., processors, sh ippers, consignment agents) for California fruits and vegetables, we identi fy three functions of contracts: they help to coordinate production, they p rovide incentives (and penalties) to induce particular behaviors, and they allow farmers and intermediaries to share risk. These functions are impleme nted via four policing instruments: input control, monitoring, quality meas urement, and revenue sharing. The instruments are employed by intermediarie s to mitigate "blind spots" in contracts and to control farmers' actions an d the quality, of their Output. This mechanism design approach is complemen ted by a sociologically oriented analysis emphasizing the embeddedness of e conomic institutions. We problematize the stylized fashion in which the con cept of authority has been treated in the contract farming literature, and propose an alternative approach to studying new organizational forms and di visions of labor among farmers and intermediaries.