The Wehrmacht at Leningrad. The war and the occupation policy of the 18th Army in the fall and winter 1941-42

Authors
Citation
J. Hurter, The Wehrmacht at Leningrad. The war and the occupation policy of the 18th Army in the fall and winter 1941-42, VIER ZEITG, 49(3), 2001, pp. 377-440
Citations number
45
Categorie Soggetti
History
Journal title
VIERTELJAHRSHEFTE FUR ZEITGESCHICHTE
ISSN journal
00425702 → ACNP
Volume
49
Issue
3
Year of publication
2001
Pages
377 - 440
Database
ISI
SICI code
0042-5702(200107)49:3<377:TWALTW>2.0.ZU;2-Y
Abstract
With the siege of Leningrad by the Wehrmacht in September 1941, a 2 1/2 yea r period of intense suffering began for the people in that city and its sur rounding regions. Hitler wanted to conquer and destroy this symbol of Russi an and Bolshevik power, but because the German forces committed there were insufficient for the task, the 18th Army was ordered to seal off Leningrad from the outside world and starve its people to death. This terrible plan, combining National Socialist dogma with economic considerations, failed in spite of the countless deaths from starvation. obviously incited by the ext ermination policy directed against the city the high command of the German occupying army also acted ruthlessly against Russian civilians living in ar eas surrounding Leningrad. In the fall and winter of 1941/42, the policy of the occupying forces consisted primarily in starving, expelling and exploi ting. Although the army needed to keep prisoners of war alive in order to u se them as laborers, it did not always do so. Driven by ideology and utilit arian consideration the army ended up with a policy of murdering the mental ly handicapped in order to solve its supply and housing problems. For all t hese actions the army's high command bore full responsibility, while lower ranking officers and common soldiers did at times exhibit greater humanity.