A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage

This article extends the Calvert-Wittman, candidate-location model by allow ing one candidate to have a valence advantage over the other, due to, say, superior character, charisma, name recognition, or intelligence. Under some fairly weak assumptions, I show that when one candidate has a small advant age over the other, this alters equilibrium policy positions in two ways. F irst, it causes the disadvantaged candidate to move away from the center. S econd, and perhaps more surprising, it causes the advantaged candidate to m ove toward the center. I also show that, under some fairly weak assumptions , for all levels of the valence advantage, the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate. Empirical studi es of congressional elections by Fiorina (1973) and Ansolabehere, Snyder, a nd Stewart (2001) support this result.