Property rights and the environment in pastoral China: Evidence from the field

It is widely perceived that the degradation of China's rangelands has accel erated since the introduction of rural reforms in the late 1970s. The popul ar explanation for this phenomenon has been that a 'tragedy of the commons' exists, as privately-owned livestock are being grazed on 'common' land. Si nce the passing of the Rangeland Law in 1985, Chinese pastoral tenure polic y has emphasized the establishment of individual household tenure as a nece ssary condition for improving incentives for sustainable rangeland manageme nt, Yet household tenure has yet to be effectively established in many past oral regions. The first objective of this article is to describe pastoral t enure arrangements in northern Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. Its second objective is to explain pastoral tenure arrangements, particularly the obs erved persistence of collective action. It is argued that there is no 'trag edy of the commons' and that it is characteristics of rangeland resources a nd the social environment that give rise to the particular types of institu tional arrangements found.