Why the mind is not a radically emergent feature of the brain

In this article I will attempt to refute the claim that the mind is a radic ally emergent feature of the brain. First, the inter-related concepts of em ergence, reducibility and constraint are considered, particularly as these ideas relate to hierarchical biological systems. The implications of radica l emergence theories of the mind such as the one posited by Roger Sperm; ar e explored. I then argue that the failure of Sperry's model is based on the notion that consciousness arises as a radically emergent feature 'at the t op command' of a non-nested neurological hierarchy. An alternative model, o ne that avoids the dualism inherent in radical emergence theories, is offer ed in which the brain is described as producing a nested hierarchy of meani ng and purpose that has no 'top' or 'summit'. Finally, I will argue there r emains a non-reducible aspect of consciousness that does not depend upon ra dical emergence theory, but rather on the mutual irreducibility, of the sub jective and objective points of view This irreducible aspect of consciousne ss can be understood as the non-mysterious result of brain evolution and no rmal neural functioning.