Forward versus spot buying of information goods

Citation
P. Gundepudi et al., Forward versus spot buying of information goods, J MANAG I S, 18(2), 2001, pp. 107-131
Citations number
15
Categorie Soggetti
Library & Information Science
Journal title
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
ISSN journal
07421222 → ACNP
Volume
18
Issue
2
Year of publication
2001
Pages
107 - 131
Database
ISI
SICI code
0742-1222(200123)18:2<107:FVSBOI>2.0.ZU;2-X
Abstract
Several information goods, such as movie distribution rights or newspapers, are sold either at spot prices, or through forward subscription buying. Ou r paper considers a firm that offers an information good through spot buyin g, forward buying at a reduced price, or a combination of the two. The time lag between forward buying and spot buying brings about an uncertainty in a consumer's reservation price for the good at the time of advance purchase . We propose a consumer decision-making model that captures this fundamenta l feature and provides interesting insights into the key elements of consum er behavior. We establish that a consumer offered the choice between forwar d buying and waiting to (possibly) buy the good on spot faces the tradeoff between a lower unit price and the value of updated preferences. We also es tablish that consumers preferring forward buying have a relatively high exp ectation and low uncertainty in their reservation prices for the good at th e time of advance purchase, while those preferring spot buying have a relat ively low expectation and high uncertainty in their reservation prices for the good. We apply the model to formulate and analyze the firm's problem when it is e ither a price taker or a price setter. When the firm is a price taker, the choice is whether to offer the good for only forward buying, only spot buyi ng, or a combination of the two. With an example, we show that when both th e spot price and the discount on forward buying are moderate in values, the seller chooses the mixed strategy of offering both forward and spot buying simultaneously. When the firm is a price setter, the goal is to choose the offering(s) and the price level(s). With the example, we show how firms se lling information goods can increase their revenues by using a mixed offeri ng strategy with both spot and forward offerings. This strategy lends itsel f to second-degree price discrimination by the seller when there are groups of customers potentially heterogeneous in terms of the distribution of the ir reservation prices. Our work takes significant importance in the context of information goods, which are becoming increasingly prominent and are be ing delivered on the Web through the mechanisms of forward and spot buying.