The pressure on aquatic renewable resources has rapidly increased over past
decades as a result of both sustained high demand and technological innova
tion. The relative scarcity of fishing resources is not new, but it seems t
oday to have become a generalised phenomena for most aquatic ecosystems fro
m local to oceanic scales. Either motivated by the desire to regulate confl
icts between groups of fishermen (gears, communities, etc.) or to improve e
fficiency by internalising part of free access externalities, fisheries man
agement appears fundamentally to represent a process of access rule definit
ion and implementation. Whatever is the instrument (output or input based,
regulatory or economic, market oriented or not) it is the structure of acce
ss rights that is initially affected. There is nothing original in the fact
that increasing relative scarcity calls for property right structure chang
es. It is also not surprising that in many cases, creating an access right
structure provides an opportunity for a market expression of resource value
. But in the case of fisheries resource appropriation is not as simple or e
asy as on land. Mobility and variability of the resource, diversity of fish
ing techniques interacting over stocks or areas, makes the case more diffic
ult. Furthermore, management instruments are not as similar as the economic
theory of management implies. Therefore, there is no straightforward answe
r. This is the reason why many different routes have been chosen to regulat
e world fisheries. In practice, efficiency and equity objectives are rarely
successfully met. The European Union, with the Common Fisheries Policy and
the various local or national management schemes, offers a fair range of s
uch examples. Referring to European examples, the key issues in the debate
over fisheries management are considered. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. Al
l rights reserved.