Episodic memory is identified with autonoetic consciousness, which gives ri
se to remembering in the sense of self-recollection in the mental re-enactm
ent of previous events at which one was present. Autonoetic consciousness i
s distinguished from noetic consciousness, which gives rise to awareness of
the past that is limited to feelings of familiarity or knowing. Noetic con
sciousness is identified not with episodic but with semantic memory, which
involves general knowledge. A recently developed approach to episodic memor
y makes use of 'first-person' reports of remembering and knowing. Studies u
sing this approach have revealed many independent variables that selectivel
y affect remembering and others that selectively affect knowing. These stud
ies can also be interpreted in terms of distinctiveness and fluency of proc
essing. Remembering and knowing do not correspond with degrees of confidenc
e in memory. Nor does remembering always control the memory response. There
is evidence that remembering is selectively impaired in various population
s, including not only amnesic patients and older adults but also adults wit
h Asperger's syndrome. This first-person approach to episodic memory repres
ents one way in which that most elusive aspect of consciousness, its subjec
tivity, can be investigated scientifically. The two kinds of conscious expe
riences can be manipulated experimentally in ways that are systematic, repl
icable and intelligible theoretically.