From the patristic period to the beginning of the seventeenth century curio
sity was regarded as an intellectual vice. Curious individuals were conside
red to be proud and "puffed up," and the objects of their investigations we
re deemed illicit, dispute engendering, unknowable, or useless. Seventeenth
-century projects for the advancement of learning had to distance themselve
s from curiosity and its dubious fruits or, alternatively, enhance the mora
l status of the curious sensibility. Francis Bacon's proposals for the inst
auration of knowledge were an integral part of a process by which curiosity
underwent a remarkable transformation from vice to virtue over the course
of the seventeenth century. The changing fortunes of this human propensity
highlight the morally charged nature of early modem debates over the status
of natural philosophy and the particular virtues required of its practitio
ners. The rehabilitation of curiosity was a crucial element in the objectif
ication of scientific knowledge and led to a gradual shift of focus away fr
om the moral qualities of investigators and the propriety of particular obj
ects of knowledge to specific procedures and methods.