Local bus services in Britain (excluding London) were deregulated in Octobe
r 1986. Bus vehicle kilometres increased after deregulation, but passenger
journeys fell and bus fares increased in real terms. The inability to rever
se the long-run decline in passenger journeys and the increase in bus fares
is often cited as evidence of the failure of deregulation to promote great
er competition in the industry. This evaluation is not clear-cut, however,
since government macroeconomic policy caused significant reductions in subs
idy to the bus industry concurrent with deregulation. It can be argued that
it is the reduction in subsidy, rather than the lack of competition, which
caused fares to increase. If this is the case, then the evaluation of dere
gulation should allow for the effects of subsidy reduction. This paper spec
ifies and tests an econometric model in which the role of subsidy reduction
is explicitly incorporated in a price-markup equation. The model can be us
ed to generate forecasts of bus fares and passenger journeys after allowing
for subsidy replacement. These forecasts are compared with those for the c
ontinuation of the regulated system. A cost-benefit analysis calculates the
net present value of the internal and external welfare gains from deregula
tion per se in Britain excluding London for 1986-97. A similar analysis is
conducted for the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of Britain.