Reference and resemblance

Many discussions between realists and non-realists have centered on the iss ue of reference, especially whether there is referential stability during t heory change. In this paper, I shall summarize the debate, sketching the pr oblems that remain within the two opposing positions, and show that both ha ve ended on their own slippery slope, sliding away from their original posi tion toward that of their opponents. In the search for a viable intermediat e position, I shall then suggest an account of reference which, to a degree , follows the causal theory in explaining reference as carving the world at its joints. Contrary to the causal theory, however, I submit that this wor ld is a phenomenal world whose variable joints exist only in a historical p rocess in which they are transmitted gradually from one generation to the n ext. According to this account, the joints of the phenomenal world are cons tituted by family resemblance, where bundles of features that span bounded areas in perceptual space underlie the joints. Furthermore, the integrity o f the cognitive process by which these joints are recognized depends on a t ransmission process by which new generations are presented with given joint s and bundles by the preceding generation. Contrary to a traditional realis t account, this heritage from the preceding generation may be transformed i nto new joints and bundles before transmission to new generations. This per mits a continuous process of referential change in which the joints and bun dles at different stages in the development of a theory can be connected by chains-of-reasoning.